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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how small and medium-sized, regional financial
service firms reacted to the financial crisis by helping their customers cope with their heightened state
financial anxiety during the Economic Crisis of 2008. It also examines the variety of strategies pursued
by these firms to rebuild consumer trust in their brands in the ensuing years.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors relied on grounded theory as a methodological
approach to understand the unfolding situation of the financial crisis and to inductively develop
a framework explaining managers’ experience with consumer financial anxiety and trust. Data collection
involved key informant interviews with 20 CEOs and senior marketing and sales professionals of
financial service firms in the USA.
Findings – The study discloses a desire among many retail financial institutions to re-personalize
their relationships with customers following the financial crisis. One motivating factor for this has
been a demand by regulators for more evidence that the firm really knows its customers. The paper
also found that some managers are ambivalent about mentioning regulatory oversight and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance to customers because it is unclear whether these
issues heighten or reduce consumer fears. More research is needed to provide guidance to managers on
how mention of regulatory oversight may be used strategically in a crisis.
Research limitations/implications – This study was limited to regional financial service firms in
the USA with assets of less than$1 billion. The extension of the study to compare other geographical
markets or to large financial service firms remains to be done. This investigation could tell us whether
consumers now trust regional banks more than they do large national banks, difference in the
strategies they employed and whether they resulted in different rates of brand equity recovery.
Practical implications – This paper suggests that the 2008 financial crisis may have resulted in
permanent changes in consumer attitudes to financial services. As one manager suggested, “consumers
have moved from a trust-me phase to a show-me phase.” This implies that financial service managers need
to rethink how they build consumer trust. Such managers would do well to consider ways of integrating
actions that reinforce the company’s integrity and commitment to its customers into different stages of
their firms’ relationships with consumers.
Social implications – Many small and medium-sized banks are re-embracing community-banking
practices including building strong personal relationships with stakeholders after years of underinvesting
due to these banks’ pursuit of property development investments. As a result of these developments,
a stronger financial services industry could likely emerge. Accordingly, trust for this battered industry
among consumers could improve.
Originality/value – This paper discuss how the depersonalization of customer interactions by
financial services firms through increased use of electronic channels and the use of call centers as
primary interaction points may have weakened customer relationships and worsened consumer
anxiety during the 2008 financial crisis. Additionally, it discusses both the failure of regulatory
oversight and the symbolic effects of the big bank failures and the Madoff scandal in heightening
consumer fears. Based on managerial interviews the paper discusses how financial service firms
countered consumer anxiety by providing social support to customers, by repersonalizing customer
interactions, and by reconnecting with local community values.
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1. Introduction
Americans’ confidence in banks reached a record low in 2012 with only 21 percent
of respondents in a nationwide poll expressing a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of
confidence in banks ( Jacobe, 2012). This is just about half of the pre-recession level
of 41 percent recorded in June 2007. This trend reflects a breathtaking drop in
consumer trust for banks following the Economic Crisis of 2008. However, in the
most recent poll taken in June 2013, confidence in US banks moved up to
26 percent suggesting that confidence in the banking industry could be rebounding
( Jacobe, 2013).
In the aftermath of such a financial crisis, scholars and practitioners must understand
how banks and financial service firms can rebuild trust in their brands in the USA.
This question is also crucial for banks outside the USA hit by the Global Financial
Crisis (Lewis, 2011). In the UK, public attitudes toward the banking sector as a whole
deteriorated markedly after the financial crisis (Bennett and Kottasz, 2012). Confidence
in many of these countries for financial institutions and banks has sunk below US
consumers’ confidence. For example, in Spring 2013, only 13 percent of Greek consumers
reported being confident in Greek financial institutions, while 16 percent of Irish
consumers indicated confidence in Irish financial institutions (Crabtree, 2013).
Such low confidence slows recovery from economic slumps. When citizens
experience moral outrage about scandals in the financial sector, they can become
wary of engaging with the financial institutions of their country (Owens, 2012).
As a result, banks have lower levels of deposits (Crabtree, 2013). With less money
on hand, banks must be more restrictive in their lending in order not to jeopardize
the money on hand that is now needed to cover potential loan defaults among the
loans already issued by the bank. The effect of this happening all over the country
is that business activity slows or goes into a recession. For these reasons,
citizen confidence in financial institutions is critical for the long-term vitality of
a nation’s economy.
With lingering uncertainty about financial systems in many other European
countries in the wake of the financial crisis, knowledge about how financial service
firms can reconnect with customers and reignite customer loyalty is acutely needed.
This study examines how regional financial service firms in the USA helped their
customers to cope with the events of the financial crisis during the 2007-2008 period
and how these firms have responded subsequently to rebuild consumer trust in their
brands. We examine the experiences of financial service firms that provide retail
banking, financial advice, investment services and mortgages to both consumers and
businesses. Many respondents asserted that their firms have been able to build even
stronger brand equity than before the crisis by refocussing on their original core
markets and repersonalizing their approach to service.
Some scholars regard the term trust as appropriate only in situations where risk is
involved and a partner stands to lose if a counterpart does not meet expected
obligations (Deutsch, 1958). Because at times our discussion refers to the public’s
general level of trust in financial institutions that may not involve personal risk, we use
the terms trust and confidence interchangeably (Table I).

Type of Institution
Bank
Bank
Bank
Bank
Bank
Bank
Bank
Investment Advisor
Investment Advisor
Investment Advisor
Bank
Bank Holding Company of
35 community banks
Life Insurance
Mortgage Wholesaler
Investment Broker
B to B Investment Broker
Investment Management
Financial Advisor
Bank
Bank

Date

5/12/10 (F)

5/20/10 (T)
11/25/09 (F)

11/30/10 (T)
8/1/12 (T)
4/2/11 (T)
3/8/11 (T)

12/14/11 (F)
11/17/10 (F)
11/18/10 (F)
11/11/10 (T)
11/7/11 (T)

11/10/09 (T)

2/18/10 (T)
7/10/10 (T)
7/29/10 (T)
4/7/11 (T)
4/7/11 (T)
1/16/12 (T)

1/18/12 (T)

Notes: T, telephone interview; F, face to face interviews

20

14
15
16
17
18
19

13

8
9
10
11
12

4
5
6
7

2
3

1

Informant

New product Development
Manager
Mortgage Consultant
Principal
Principal
Director of Marketing
Principal
First VP of Wealth
Management
Branch Manager

Sr Credit Officer and Chief
Lending Officer
VP Agricultural Lending
President along with Senior
Lender
CEO
Branch President
President
Senior Personal Bank
Manager
CEO
CEO
Senior Managing Director
President
Chairman and CEO

Job

Northeast

Northeast
Northeast
Northeast
Midwest
Southeast
Northeast

Rocky mountain
Northeast
Northeast
Rocky mountain
Rocky mountain
and midwest
Northeast

Great lakes
Rocky mountain
Rocky mountain
Rocky mountain

Rocky mountain
Rocky mountain

Rocky mountain

Region

town
town
town
town

area
area
area
area
area
area
Metro area

Metro
Metro
Metro
Metro
Metro
Metro

Metro area
Metro area
Metro area
Small town
Metro area and
small towns
Metro area

Small
Small
Small
Small

Small town
Small town

Small town

Locale
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Method: grounded theory
As a research methodology, grounded theory seeks to understand a phenomenon and
develop theory with explanatory power by grounding research in the empirical context
using qualitative research guidelines (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). We consider grounded
theory research methodology appropriate to the present study because we sought to
understand a phenomenon that was continuing to unfold. As the financial crisis
evolved from the initial failure of high-risk adjustable mortgage lenders to large banks
and then to high rates of home foreclosures, the evidence suggested that consumer
trust had markedly deteriorated.
In response to the financial crisis, financial service firms reacted with a variety
of strategies over the 2009-2012 period of the study. Over this period consumer
perceptions and brand imagery of financial institutions were fluid, representing ongoing
interaction between imperiled financial institutions and vulnerable consumers. Under
these circumstances we considered a qualitative approach involving semi-structured
interviews that allowed us to identify and probe a developing phenomenon to be the
most appropriate data collection technique. We used the grounded theory research
method as a guide for analyzing and developing a conceptual framework from the data.
We created an interview protocol to ensure that all our interviews covered four basic
themes. The first theme was to investigate the reactions and experiences of consumers
during and after the 2008 period. Interviewees typically responded by describing the
significant events that impacted their sector as the crisis unfolded. The second theme
we inquired about was the firm’s response specifically related to adjustments in the
customer experience, such as changing regular policies and procedures that were in
place prior to the crisis. Our third theme explored how the crisis impacted consumer
trust in their brand. When necessary, we attempted to elicit objective reactions by
prompting interviewees with statistics indicating that consumer trust in the financial
sector at large and in specific brands had largely collapsed. Fourth, we explored whether
and how the firm had responded with trust-building efforts. In choosing these discussion
themes, our goal was to be broad enough to allow the grounded theory concept of
emergence to take place (Glaser, 2001). As the elements of our conceptual framework
and potential relationships began to emerge across the interviews, we became more
interventionist (Strauss, 1987) by adjusting our script to verify our interpretation and
to establish the generalizability of emergent themes across our interviews.
We targeted a key knowledgeable informant within relevant financial service firms.
Interviewees were senior managers including marketing and sales professionals of
financial service firms. We completed 20 interviews over the period 2009-2012. As
directed by grounded theory methodology, both data collection and analysis were
conducted concurrently. Our decision to end data collection at 20 interviews was
guided by the precept of theoretical saturation which holds that further data collection
is not imperative when new insights are not being produced (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
We experienced theoretical saturation when our later interviews provided general
support for our emergent framework rather than generating new substantive insights.
Our analysis involved open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) by reviewing interview
content to identify labels indicating what a statement represents or demonstrates. We then
created concept cards for each code allowing us to attribute statements to codes and make
comparisons within a coding category, as well as across coding categories. Samples of the
codes and supporting interviewee statements are presented in the appendix.
Sampling. The financial institutions represented in the study are not major financial
institutions that might be deemed to be “too big to fail” (institutions whose sudden

demise would disrupt the economy of the nation). At the time of the data collection,
the branches of the financial institutions represented in the study had assets of less
than $1 billion. Those with assets less than $500 million would be “small” in the view
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2006). Those with assets of $500 million to
$1 billion would be “medium” in size. The important point here is that these financial
institutions were not titanic in size, but were primarily focussed on local and regional
lending and service.
Because open coding was part of our grounded theory approach, open sampling
was employed in order to obtain the most relevant data about regional financial
institutions’ response to the financial crisis (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Accordingly,
the informants for the study were identified by their association with the authors’
universities and by their role in their financial service firms. A quota sampling approach
was employed to diversify the sample across two regions of the USA – the Northeast
(eight informants), and the Rocky Mountain West (nine informants). Finally, additional
informants from the Great Lakes, the Midwest, and the Southeast were included to
broaden the final sample and check findings obtained from institutions operating in the
Northeast and the Rocky Mountain West.
Events related to the financial crisis. By March of 2007 the subprime mortgage
interest rates had begun to adjust to unsustainably high levels for many homeowners,
leaving them unable to keep pace with mortgage payments and forcing many high-risk
subprime mortgage lenders into bankruptcy (Redmond, 2013). Underlying this was
a gathering decline in home prices across the USA progressively draining consumer
confidence. The S&P Case-Shiller National Home Price Index peaked in June 2006 at
189.93 and subsequently declined to a trough in March 2012 of 124.08 (S&P Dow Jones
Indices, 2013).
The decline in home prices and rising household mortgage defaults precipitated the
failure of large investment banks with hedge funds invested in mortgage-backed
securities in 2008 (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Bear Stearns collapsed
and was taken over by JP Morgan Chase. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in
September 2008 and went out of business. Merrill Lynch was taken over by Bank
America. The Federal Reserve was forced to acquire AIG in order to avoid possible
contagious effects of the failure of a large embedded insurance company. Top among
the bank failures of 2008 were Washington Mutual with assets of $307 billion, and
IndyMac with assets of $32.1 billion (Grind, 2012). Both of these were thrifts (savings
and loan banks) intended to meet the needs of local customers in need of asset-backed
mortgage loans. But both grew through acquisitions as well as aggressive marketing
and lending practices to become behemoths in the financial services realm in the years
prior to their failures. Their extreme drive for growth made Washington Mutual and
IndyMac incomparable with the regional financial institutions of the current study.
Needless to say, amid the swirling discussion of a federal rescue package for the
banking sector, these events created considerable anxiety among financial consumers.
By the time the Madoff scandal exploded in December 2008 when Bernard Madoff’s
hedge fund Ascot Partners was exposed as a Ponzi scheme (Lenzner, 2008), consumers
were gripped by considerable financial anxiety and turned to their financial advisor and
brokers for advice on how to negotiate the turbulent and apparently unavoidable events.
Trust in financial services. Consumers draw on different sources for assurance in
dealing with financial services. They place trust in the brands or firms with whom they
do business and if they repeatedly interact with a particular staff member, such as a
retail branch manager, interpersonal trust may be influential, as well. Consumers
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develop trust in a firm by observing its operating policies and procedures and
consumers are more likely to trust firms that have benevolent policies and procedures
toward customers (Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002).
Trust in the firm and interpersonal trust are supplemented by broad scope trust
that develops in the minds of those consumers and business persons comprising the
networks in which financial services firms operate (Grayson et al., 2008). Broad scope
trust is comprised of both generalized trust and system trust. Generalized trust is
the trust one places in the average person one meets in a given situation. In the case
of financial services, it is the trust one places in a front-line employee one meets in a
financial service firm. Generalized is contextual to the industry and society and not
brand/firm specific. System trust is consumer trust emanating from knowing that
there is regulatory oversight by government regulators and professional associations
(such as the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Security and Exchange Commission). The financial crisis negatively
impacted the aforementioned types of consumer trust.
For reasons we discuss below, interpersonal trust became less relevant in many
financial service relationships in the years leading up to the financial crisis. Trust in
the brand was often damaged by poor customer service, draconian increases in bank
charges and credit card interest rate, the maturing of adjustable rate mortgages,
overenthusiastic foreclosures and the acceptance of government financial bailouts
(Sidel, 2010). Additionally, well-publicized incidents of questionable ethics by Wall
Street operatives involved with synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and
unwarranted excessive bonuses severely damaged generalized trust (Lewis, 2010).
Regulatory oversight largely failed to predict and deter the crisis (Redmond, 2013).
Federal Deposit Insurance seemed to have fulfilled its role of providing a last resort
for consumers in avoiding a total loss of confidence among consumers. As the
aforementioned types of trust diminished, consumer uncertainty grew.
2. A model for small and medium-sized firms in the financial services sector
Model overview
Before presenting the key themes that emerged from the field interviews of the study, it
is valuable to provide an overview of how the crisis may have affected consumer
confidence in financial service firms. Figure 1 depicts the emergent model of consumer
financial anxiety during and after the Economic Crisis of 2008. Sources of financial
anxiety can be seen on the left side of the figure, while the trust-building response of
regional financial service firms can be seen on the right side. Although all financial
service customers experienced anxiety to some degree, our interviews reveal that
smaller and regional firms were better placed to calm customer anxiety during the
crisis. The depersonalization trend, the failure of big brands, and reduced system trust
were major sources of financial anxiety for customers. Next, we discuss each of these.
Depersonalization of the customer relationship
Based on the interviews of this study, we propose that changes in the way financial
service firms interacted with their customers for about ten years prior to the financial
crisis created fertile circumstances for the anxiety and crisis of trust consumers
experienced beginning on 2008. For example, the late 1990s to early 2000s witnessed
two major trends in customer relations that led to a depersonalization of the
relationship between financial service firms and their customers (O’Loughlin and
Szmigin, 2007). The first trend was the rise of the web site as a service delivery channel.

Small and Medium-Sized Firm
Trust-Building Reaction
Anxiety Sources

Consumer
financial anxiety

Shift from selling to social
support
Depersonalization:
• From personal to
non-personal

Repersonalization:
• From firm and brand
trust to interpersonal
and hybrid

• From interpersonal
to online
+
Failure of Brands
• Big Financial Brands
• Madoff Scandal

Failure of public-system
trust

Consumer
Financial
Anxiety
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–
Shift from public-system
trust to private-system trust

Refocus on community
branding
• “We are the un-big bank”
• Opportunistic poaching
• Re-commit to networking

The big banks and investment houses relentlessly pursued a digitization race during
the 1997-2007 period to increase customer reach, and reduce customer maintenance
costs using online channels. The pervading logic was that web site channels would
elicit greater customer involvement and free-up front-line employees from focussing on
routine customer maintenance, giving them more time to do relationship building. But
interpersonal relationship building efforts were not pursued commensurately. Beyond
the elicitation of habitual visits of consumers, financial service firms had not figured
out how to build lasting emotional relationships online with consumers.
Relationship depersonalization was also present in consumer relationships with
smaller financial institutions like community banks, but for a different reason than for
large banks. Our interviews with financial professionals reveal that small financial
institutions generally did not pursue the rapid automation to digitized channels that
larger institutions pursued preferring to maintain interpersonal contacts. However,
our interviews indicate that during the low interest rate period beginning in 2000-2001,
some community and regional banks became distracted by real-estate investment
opportunities beyond their home market. This distraction led them to neglect
their relationship-building efforts within their local market. Because these real-estate
investments were regarded as opportunities with potential for abnormal returns that
eclipsed those in the region, in some cases employees were shifted from front-line support
to work in back-office investment initiatives for speculations out of the region. Even
basic customer-relation activities normally associated with community banking such as
greeting customers, knowing customer families and sponsoring community groups were
neglected in order to maximize new business opportunities and lower operational costs.
The second trend that emerged from our interviews that accounted for depersonalization
of customer relationships was the shift away from personal accountability. Even when
service relationships remained personalized, they were stripped of personal accountability.
The call center ethos that is intended to increase customer access, in effect, reduces
customers to a reference number directing any call-center customer-service person to
a customer’s account. Undoubtedly this approach improved customer access, convenience
and responsiveness, but diminished the customer’s sense that someone is personally
obligated to deliver the service.

Figure 1.
A model of trust-building
by regional financial
institutions during and
after the financial crisis
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Consumer-level trust has cognitive and affective dimensions ( Johnson and Grayson,
2005). Cognitive trust is consumer trust in the competency and reliability of the service
firm. Cognitive trust provides a basis for the development of affective trust, which is
emotion-based, and arises from interpersonal liking. Web sites can covey cognitive trust
by virtue of the clarity of their design, ease of use, and usefulness of the information and
utilities they contain. However, web sites are less able to spark affective trust with
consumers despite their ability to elicit fun feelings.
Following the repeal of most of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, financial service firms pursued economies of scale
and efficiency through mergers and acquisitions that transformed many community
and regional banks into satellites of national conglomerates. Accordingly, interpersonal
relationships became less important in the sales and purchase cycle of these financial
service firms now embedded in vast organizations. This occurred in the rapid expansion
of Washington Mutual from 1999 to 2006 when its number of branches more than
doubled from 1,200 to 2,600 (Goodman and Morgenson, 2008).
In such large-scale financial service firms, customer-facing decisions have become
increasingly directed by software-based decisions geared toward insuring a customer
gets the “next best offer” ( Jeffery, 2010). Although we recognize that financial service
relationships can be effective without a strong affective component if they deliver good
service quality and customer satisfaction (Dalziel et al., 2011), we argue that a reduced
emphasis on building interpersonal relationships at the local level made financial
service firms more vulnerable in the financial crisis.
As the influence of customer-facing and local decision making became more
marginalized, remote and disconnected decision making led to relationship blind spots,
inadequate service recovery, customer dissatisfaction, and lower consumer trust in the
firm. In summary, financial service firms’ ability to elicit affective trust from consumers,
whether due to the rise of various electronic channels as the primary interaction mode
with customers or the replacement of personal accountability with only case number
accountability, stunted the development of customer relationships marked by high
commitment and loyalty. Such commitment and loyalty can help to dampen customer
anxiety in a crisis.
Consumer anxiety
Our interviews disclosed that financial advisors encountered high levels of anxiety
among their clients, especially in the 2007-2009 period. Our interviewees reported that
community and regional banking customers’ most frequent question during this period
was “Is my money safe?” Customer-contact employees readily answered with a resounding
“Yes!” But within an environment of national and regional bank failures, this did not put
customer anxiety to rest. There was a realization that if Lehman could go out of business,
anyone could. Even when there was no specific damage to the brand itself, it still fell to
front-line employees to attenuate uncertainty among customers.
A stock broker who serves religious institutions mentioned that some customers
felt there was no good place to hide. Client expectation was centered on how to
minimize loss rather than maximize gain. A substantial amount of the time of
bankers was devoted to “hand holding” in the words of one financial advisor. This was
done within a broader context of attributing blame to large financial institutions.
The refrain among small and medium-sized financial service firms was that the
problems were caused by the “big banks.” According to these laments, it was others
(such as Countrywide, Wachovia, and Lehman Brothers) that created the problem.

Financial advisors and brokers in smaller firms devoted much of their meetings to
managing client uncertainty.
Arguably, the nature of the Economic Crisis of 2008 and the uncertainty it generated
constituted an attack on generalized trust. As one respondents suggested “if we can’t
trust regulated institutions, whom can we trust.” As consumers became skeptical of
big brands, they sought reassurance from their financial service providers. Even in the
absence of deleterious actions by a specific bank, there was a sense among many
consumers that the financial environment was highly uncertain and possibly this was
transferrable to specific brands.
Small and medium-sized firm trust-building reaction
From selling to social support. Playing out against the backdrop of the financial crisis,
the Madoff scandal seemed to have crystalized in consumers’ mind the worst case
scenario of trusting the financial service industry. This event triggered behavioral
changes among many investing consumers. One small brokerage firm located in
Greenwich, Connecticut, reported a steady stream of customers from the big firms
following the Madoff scandal that broke into the news during December 2008. The firm
attributed this phenomenon to consumers becoming more proactive as inquiring
investors in light of previous events of the financial crisis. According to one employee
interviewed, “Service at a small firm is better. A small firm answers questions. We do
not advertise. All business is referral. We do only ‘warm call’ only from word of mouth.
They (customers) have been unhappy about the Madoff situation.”
One brokerage firm increased its annual customer meetings from two to three per year.
It refocussed its newsletter on themes of explaining what was happening and why and
how the firm was responding to it. These smaller financial institutions may have had
an advantage in not building online service delivery capabilities, but instead improved
their interpersonal channels. Our interviewees reported that their socially supportive
action during the crisis was successful. An informant from a brokerage firm based in
Connecticut asserted that their brand image actually improved relative to the rest of the
financial markets following the crisis and in particular during the Madoff scandal.
In the case of mortgage brokers, however, there is little or no evidence of a shift from
selling to social support. Reputation improvement was also not reported. The marketing/
sales philosophy of the mortgage broker industry contributed to its reputation decline.
As one broker interviewed pointed out, small-shop brokers do not think about the brand.
Instead, they focus on execution of each transaction and managing the relationship with
the big banks on whose behalf they grant mortgage loans to consumers. Mortgage
brokers are almost totally transaction focussed. It is about executing on each transaction,
collecting a commission and getting a referral for the next customer. To mortgage
brokers, the equity of their brand comes from customer experience on each transaction.
If the customer experiences timely procedures and good values including trustworthy
behavior on each transaction, they are likely to provide referrals. However, the transaction
focus of the mortgage business discourages tracking of brand perceptions over time.
In many financial service firms, brand strategy seemed far removed from the realities
of customer experience at product and front-line employee levels. In one financial
conglomerate that includes retail banking, brand advertising is at the corporate level,
while the division’s contribution to the brand’s image is through the definition and
execution of the customer experience. It is unclear from our interviews how much these
two things are connected within the mental models of middle managers and front-line
employees. The brand strategy and brand values need to be operationalized in policies,
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procedures, and language that shape the customer experience while capturing and
systematizing the skills and innovation of the most effective employees. Counter to this
insight, investment trusts and mutual fund managers with whom we spoke saw their
most effective brand positioning strategy as placing well-known successful investors on
their board of directors.
Re-personalization of the customer experience. Interestingly, the financial crisis may
have provided an opportunity for many regional and small financial service firms to
benefit from their relationship capabilities. Our interviews disclose a passion among
many retail financial institutions to re-personalize their relationships with customers
following the financial crisis. Many small and medium-sized banks are re-embracing
community-banking practices after years of underinvesting due to these banks’ pursuit
of property development investments – many of these out of their home region (in
places that experienced a steep drop in property values, such as the State of Arizona).
Following the channel migration efforts of retail banks during the period 2000-2007,
involving shifting low-potential customers to online channels, there has been a shift to
greater interpersonal contact on a local level with clients. Executives of regional and
small financial service firms report that they have increased the time their managers
and employees spend interacting with customers. The aim is to infuse the brand with
interpersonal affect to complement consumer interaction with electronic channels. For
instance, many banks brought on board full-time mortgage officers to operate within
their retail branches. This is an attempt to soften prior efforts to centralize their
mortgage operations using national call-center style operations that handle mortgages.
These banks are now supplementing such call center operations with in-store
mortgage brokers knowledgeable about local markets. Real-estate agents and first-time
buyers prefer to do business with local mortgage brokers because these agents
and buyers have a real person with whom to speak when things go wrong or when
redundant requests for documents occur.
One stock broker interviewed mentioned that the firm’s online channel mostly
serves institutional customers. Individuals are accustomed to holding other individuals
accountable for their promises. The notion of holding a firm accountable and doing
so via a technological channel, especially when the consumer considers their situation
to be unique, may be disquieting to many.
Re-personalization is not merely motivated by the insight of financial marketers.
As a direct reaction to the crisis, our interviewees reported that industry regulators
are encouraging a return to deep knowledge of customers as an essential aspect of
due diligence. Retail banking regulators are pushing for more personal contact with
customers seeking loans. More detailed evidence of deliberation and oversight by loan
committees is being required by bank examiners, increasing the need for personal
rapport with customers. A bank president we interviewed put it this way:
There has been a push to increase personal contact with our customers. Ironically, this has
been forced by examiners. The examiners now want more file comments on loans. This gives
the reason to know with whom you are dealing.

Another of the regional bankers interviewed saw re-personalization as a core near-term
strategy for competing with large banks:
I think that is why the regional banks like [y] are gonna be successful because we’re big
enough to offer the services and the products but we’re small enough that you’re still a person,
you’re not a number. I think particularly in the near term that’s very important because that’s
where the people get the comfort level.

Regional bankers reported cancelling annual branch and senior managers’ meetings
and redeploying these managers to do customer interface at branch locations.
One regional banker reported that now when his bank creates online accounts
for customers, the staff members are careful to say to the customer: “I’m not telling you
I don’t want you to come in. I’m trying to make it more convenient for you.”
Some community banks have been forced to review their strategy and question the
value they are bringing to the relationship with customers. These community bankers
realized that the recent accelerated growth in web site and mobile channels were
simply the price of competing and not a substitute for relationship building. Without
effective community engagement and relationship building, community bankers that
we interviewed believe that community banks will lose their competitive advantage.
The role of the FDIC. Regulation CC of the US Federal Reserve Board requires that
US financial institutions include a notice of funds availability to customers on the back
of deposit slips and also that certain notices be given to customers while opening
an account (Federal Reserve Bank, 2013). However, in a crisis situation, financial
institutions cannot rely only on impersonal communication with customers, but may
need to provide personalized assurances, as well. While the financial service operatives
interviewed believed the FDIC is valuable in eliciting consumer trust in their firm, they
were less convinced that mentioning regulatory oversight to the customer would
have the same effect. Some suggested that raising the issue creates an unnecessary
distraction for a customer who may already trust their brand. Others routinely mention
regulatory oversight of their business by government agencies to their customers.
Alternatively, others regarded mention of the FDIC and oversight as absolutely
necessary in a high-anxiety situation. The consensus was that reminding customers
about deposit insurance may be effective in a high-anxiety period of bank failures
when many customers are apprehensive about holding deposits with their bank that
exceed the FDIC guaranteed limit.
A regional bank manager interviewed mentioned that when two other banks in the
region failed, the bank decided to remind its customers of the extent of federal deposit
insurance protection via conversation and brochure mailings. Another regional bank
initiated conversation with all customers with balances in excess of the FDIC limit to
assure them of the security of their deposits with the bank. In general, when interviews
turned to focus on regulators, the financial managers interviewed tended to focus on
the time burden and onerous effort required to meet regulatory requirements. These
respondents only mentioned the benefits of risk reduction and trust-building aspect of
regulation as an afterthought.
In summary, the FDIC is viewed by managers as an assurance mechanism to be
used only if necessary during a crisis. In this role, it may not build trust in the brands,
but more importantly it may help to stem a crisis of trust in the industry. Despite this
role of guarantor of much of the deposits in the banking system (and thereby, serving
as an enormous risk-reducer in the system), respondents’ top-of-mind thoughts about
the federal government frequently focussed on the required record-keeping and
compliance measures mandated by federal agencies.
Emphasize private system trust. System trust is trust that arises from the oversight
and enforcement mechanisms of government, legal-regulatory infrastructure, as well
as professional organizations (Grayson et al., 2008). Following the Madoff scandal,
small and medium-sized financial services struggled with how to reassure customers
that their operations were subject to regulatory oversight without heightening customer
fears. Many retail investment services attempted to increase customer confidence by
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being more forthcoming about policies and procedural controls built into their
operations. For example, investment brokers we interviewed reported that they started
telling clients that they are unable to misapply client’s un-invested funds because
the balances are held separately by a clearing bank. Clearing banks (such as the
National Financial Services Inc., a subsidiary of Fidelity Investment Inc. the leading
401 K management firm) were frequently mentioned to customers. Although regulators
require that such accounts be separately held by a custodian, this was not regularly
mentioned to customers.
We refer to this attempt to build customer trust by relying on control mechanisms
provided by corporate partners as a “reliance on private system trust.” In relying on
private system trust, investment firms are depending on the reputation of a for-profit-firm
as a custodian of funds on behalf of the customer in a manner analogous to public-system
trust from regulatory oversight provided by a government agency.
The question arose across some of our interviews as to whether consumer skepticism
toward the financial service industry would be a permanent legacy of the 2007-2008
financial crisis. An investment-fund manager pointed out that the collective reputation of
the industry was hurt by the Madoff scandal and added that although the investment
manager’s firm was able to overcome the skepticism of its existing customers, it has not
been so easy with new customers who seem to require more convincing. Another
interviewee was of the opinion that increased consumer skepticism is a possibly lasting
effect of the financial crisis for the financial service industry. He pointed out the following:
Consumers are no longer in the ‘tell-me’ phase. They have transitioned to the ‘show-me’
phase. Trust has to be gained through positive service experiences. We talk about this a lot in
our meetings. It is up to us to reassure people. We reassure them about us by taking every
opportunity to talk about our capitalization and FDIC insurance. We put in extra effort to let
customers know where we are and being explicit about it. We don’t try to hide anything or try
being perceived as being less than forthcoming. We want to be transparent.

A fund management executive mentioned that although a record of performance is
ultimately the most important factor in building trust, there are other factors that are
extremely important, as well. For example, adherence to the fund’s investment
philosophy (e.g. value vs growth) is critical. Investment management firms mentioned
the value of showing clients that the firm is keeping the right company by recruiting
qualified professionals and by having leading and well-recognized investment-industry
professionals on the board of directors.
Branding refocussed on the community
We are the un-big bank. Our study revealed that regional and community banks have
used the experiences of the failed and vulnerable banks to pivot and return to the
values of their local markets. This strategy plays to the notions that the “big banks”
caused the mess and that we are the “un-big” or “un-Wall Street” bank that has always
been with the customer. A branch president of a regional bank we interviewed
mentioned that “we’ve advertised to the effect that we’re family owned, that we didn’t
take government funding, that we’re well capitalized, and we’re kind of playing
on that as well.” This rebranding approach attempts to build trust by associating
with regional generalized trust through embellishment of the bank with the Rocky
Mountain region’s values of independence and family.
The president of a regional bank suggested that in an uncertain environment people
are likely to assume that the financial status of a bank is more weak than strong unless
they hear otherwise. He continued that the basic message was “we did not take TARP

money, our credit rating is high, we have a great balance sheet, we have been making
money through the downturn and we are here to make loans” (TARP refers to the
Troubled Asset Relief Program introduced in 2008 by which the US Government
acquired the troubled assets to US financial institutions). The bank president told us
that this message has been effective, resulting in market share gains in all markets.
This embrace of a local-values strategy is frequently executed with an emphasis on the
local ownership of the bank – often owned by a local family.
A rural banker we interviewed mentioned that consumers maintained their trust in
a community bank throughout the crisis and attributed this to consumers’ awareness
that the bank is owned by a wealthy family with diverse investments throughout the
state. This strategy also involved targeting important customers and key stakeholders
with information reinforcing the strength of the ownership structure of the bank.
The advertising for this community bank talked about the financial security,
diversification of the bank’s parent company and ownership by local family. The idea
being that this institution has the backing to raise additional capital if needed.
As a manager said, “We communicated that financial strength was not only within the
bank, but behind the bank.”
Opportunistic poaching. Another branding strategy detected in the study is the
opportunistic poaching of customers. The messaging strategy for poaching customers
involved two variations. There is the basic approach of responding to inquiries of
customers of known at-risk competitors, or by running ads that expressly mention
that the advertised bank is a trusted brand. The second variant of this messaging
is to increase consumer awareness that not all banks may be secure. A bank manager
reported that their advertising encourages, especially younger post-baby boomers
(under 50 years old), to become more discriminating in their choice of banks by making
sure the bank they choose is well capitalized and likely to be around for the long term.
Another retail bank manager of a well-capitalized bank we interviewed mentioned that
his bank executed this strategy by educating customers on the importance of strength
of capitalization in choosing a bank and by positioning their brand as the solution.
Re-commitment to networking. Some firms seem less convinced as to the efficacy of
media advertising as a means of rebuilding brand trust following the financial crisis.
One community bank decided to stick to a strategy of no media advertising even
at the most crucial period of the crisis. Instead, they remain focussed on middle and
senior managers speaking at local events such as community forums, project launches
and workshops. Their view was that speaking directly with consumers allowed the
bank to build quality relationships. The core message consistently delivered was that
“We are financially strong, we have money to lend, and we were never involved in the
improprieties that led to the financial crisis.”
Several smaller financial institutions, such as banks and investment management
firms, mentioned a reaffirmation of their commitment to community involvement as
a major marketing vehicle. Serving on non-profit boards and pursuing public speaking
opportunities brings the financial professionals closer to customers as they experience
episodes in their lives that require them to reevaluate their financial plans.
3. Conclusions and further research
As a qualitative study aimed at exploring the issues involved in rebuilding brand trust,
this study uncovered several findings that hold potential for further research. First, as
a result of the financial crisis, many small and medium-sized financial service firms
placed more emphasis on repersonalizing their interactions with customers including
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embracing local values and repositioning away from large banks. In light of this, it
would be timely to better understand if small or regional institutions now enjoy higher
levels of consumer trust compared with large national brands since the crisis.
Conceptually, this question is multilayered. First, the basis of trust may vary with firm
size because trust in large firms may be based more on observed management policies
and practices (Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002) whereas trust in small and medium-sized firms
may be based more on interpersonal interactions resembling trust in social relationships
( Johnson and Grayson, 2005). Second, consumer trust in large firms may be more
technology based (online) ( Johnson, 2007) and impersonal (team or call-center) rather
than person specific when compared with small or medium-sized firms. Researchers
would do well to investigate the success of different approaches used by large banks to
achieve forgiveness and to regain trust with customers.
We also observed a lack of clear consensus about how firms should strategically use
their relationship with regulatory bodies to support their brands in challenging times.
While bankers were more inclined to mention the assurance of the FDIC, some retail
bankers were not inclined to mention aspects of regulatory oversight and were
prepared to assume that customers already knew about regulatory oversight (e.g. by
the Comptroller of the Currency, and by the Security Exchange Commission). Some of
this ambivalence may be due to frustration with regulatory red-tape as some mentioned.
Research by Grayson et al. (2008) demonstrated that narrow scope trust in the firm
mediates the effect of system trust on customer satisfaction and purchase levels.
This means that customer trust in regulatory oversight only increases customer
loyalty with a business if it also increases trust in the firm or brand (narrow scope
trust). It is therefore critical that managers make an explicit link between the
regulatory oversight and their brand, especially in a crisis situation. We recommend
that managers be more attentive to how and to when regulatory oversight should be
mentioned to customers. Further research is needed to understand consumer reaction
to assurances of regulatory oversight. There may be a moderating effect on the trust
relationship between customers and a bank when information about regulatory
oversight is sent from the bank to the customer.
We stated earlier that beginning in the mid to late 1990s online banking emerged,
but concomitantly, so did depersonalization of financial service relationships.
Depersonalization contributed to higher levels of consumer anxiety that peaked in
the aftermath of the Economic Crisis of 2008. While it may be practical for small
and medium-sized financial institutions to offer limited service delivery via electronic
channels, the question for mega-banks is how to assuage the anxiety of customers
in the next crisis. As consumers transition to e-banking as the primary mode of
interaction, banks need to develop the capability to provide assurances in an interactive
manner to customers. While our study found evidence that small and medium-sized
banks can effectively provide interactive assurances to its customers during an
unfolding financial crisis, more research is needed that focusses on the effectiveness of
mega-banks to do the same thing.
As we mentioned heretofore, it is unclear from our interviews that day-to-day
interactions with customers in firms reflect a coordinated brand strategy. We found,
especially in the case of mortgage brokers, that there was an assumption that the focus
should be on taking care of each transaction or each customer and that branding will
take care of itself. We think that more research is needed to understand how marketing
strategy is developed and executed in financial service firms. For example, research
could focus on identifying the basic assumptions made by managers about the

relationship between strategy development and strategy execution. Additionally,
research could also focus on how managers pivot to new strategies over time.
Managers we interviewed in this study raised the possibility that consumers may
have become more skeptical of financial service providers, viewing the industry as less
trustworthy following the crisis. This suggests that broad scope, generalized trust in
the financial service industry has been damaged (Grayson et al., 2008) resulting in the
average consumer having a low-level of trust in the typical financial service firm.
However, what is not known fully is how much trust the average consumer has with
his or her own financial services provider(s). Research focussing on the differing levels
of trust consumers might have for their own bank and banks in general is now in order.
The results of this study suggest that many small firms in the US financial services
sector lost their customer focus during the years leading up to the Economic Crisis of
2008. However, the firms that maintained strong interpersonal interaction capabilities
and were able to pivot quickly by redirecting resources to reducing customer anxiety
may have created stronger relationships than before the 2008 crisis.
Findings from this study also suggest that as financial service firms direct their
efforts toward gaining operational efficiencies in more prosperous times, prudent
managers are mindful not to underinvest in genuinely human capabilities (such as
listening, empathy, caring, and responsiveness) that are essential to maintaining
customer relationships in leaner times. In this way, these firms manifest an adaptability
and resilience that bodes well for their prospects in an uncertain future for the financial
services industry. Because adaptability and resilience are more characteristic of human
beings than machines, firm managers would do well to develop the human capital of
their organizations through training of employees and the nurturing of responsive
organizations in order to best serve their customers in times of financial crisis, as well as
in times of prosperity.
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Appendix. Examples of comments identifying constructs of the model
De-personalization
12/14/11 Financial institutions consolidated and grew larger, for the ten years previous to
what happened in ’08, the level of trust naturally declined because local decision making had a

smaller impact in the market. You know, personal relationships were taken out of the equation
and swapped for economies and scale and efficiency. And because of that consolidation and the
change from local decision-making and relationship based transactions to you know, although
very convenient, more product as opposed to services and disconnected decision-making from
their financial institutions and a diminished role of the local decision makers, that’s kind of in
general one of the reasons.
11/30/10: Why did other banks pursue out-of-region participations? “There was pressure from
pride or internal pressure. I like to say ‘they got a taste of the Kool-aid.’ If they were making
7 percent return in the region, and might obtain 8 or 9 percent out of the region, they went for it.
They also were charging points and origination fees. The bottom line looked good for a while,
but they got out of their knowledge base.”
Failure of brands
4/7/10 “There were concerns among our customers springing from the various situations.
We run a boutique business. We serve many religious institutions and they felt like there was
no good place to hide. We spent more time making our clients feel comfortable with the
situation. There was a heighten sense of the need for due diligence. Customers felt that if M. L.
and Lehmann could co out of business, anyone could.”
4/2/11 I mean during the crisis there was a general I think panic out there relative to not only
XXX Bank but my industry and people were – I recall many instances actually where people
would come to us and place deposits that they could be assured were inside the FDIC level.
2/18/10 Customers have short temper.
Madoff scandal
11/17/10 The fund of funds held out the illusion that they were actually monitoring managers.
How could that be true if they allowed Bernie Madoff into their funds? Anyone who had done the
most perfunctory research on Madoff would know that he marked his own positions to market,
that he was using a two-man accounting firm in New City, which is in Rockland County in a
strip mall. Those are two enormous red flags. You never allow any manager to mark
your own positions. It has to be a third party, independent, saying “This is what’s in the portfolio.
This is the price.”
Regional-firm trust-building reaction
Shift from selling to social support
4/7/11 I did a lot of hand holding during the crisis. It was the big brands that created the crisis
BOA, ML, etc. We keep things conservative – not getting into problem areas. We shifted
strategy – more face-to-face – more so for old people. Younger people value this less. People have
become very conservative.
8/1/12 “In fact we cancelled, we have an annual meeting held every year that really reduces
the number of employees that are within our financial institutions for two days and most of the
people there are upper management. We cancelled that meeting right after that large financial
crisis just due to the fact that we wanted to be located in the bank. We wanted to be able to help
our customers during that time.”
4/2/11 “I spent many meetings discussing the FDIC insurance levels with customers and
prospects, so there was a general feeling I think out there during that particular time where
people were very, very nervous of maintaining deposits in banks particularly over the FDIC
coverage level.”
Repersonalization
7/10/10 Product complexity has increased so individuals require more individual advice.
Big firms are better online because it costs them less. Small firms don’t want customers to trade
online – not why customers come to us – we want to talk to customers and teach them.
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2/18/10 Mortgage brokers rather use a local branch because it has someone they can contact if
they have an issue. Real estate agents prefer to work with a local agene they know.
4/7/10 We are getting new clients that previously did not have enough time with their advisors.
2/18/10 From 2000 to 2006 there was very little fact to face contact (mortgage industry). In the
mid-90 s everyone was face to face. Now there is more back to face to face. Especially first time
home buyers want to know who they are dealing with. They are more about meeting initially and
face to face is an important inflection point.
4/2/11 So what we try to do is to be present to buy corporate tables, to serve on boards, and to
be leaders within non-profit organizations, within the chamber, and just have a face that is out
there and that’s a terrible way to put it, but an individual that is involved with organizations that
gains relationships and when that business feels like it has a need that may not be being met, for
example, at a prospect by their current institutions, that that person from XXX Bank is the first
person they’ll talk to.
3/8/11 And we have seen some people move away from that banking environment to come back
to a community bank. One of our advertising focal points is the fact that we are locally owned.
11/11/10 Yes – There has been a push to increase personal contact with our customers.
Ironically, this has been forced by examiners. The examiners now want more file comments
on loans. This gives the reason to know with whom you are dealing. It is forcing more oversight.
We have to stay in touch with what is going on out there. It has led to more discussion and more
detailed committee minutes. We have more detailed board minutes about the economy. It is no
longer good enough to include the annual report for the town.
Shift from public-system trust to private system trust
7/14/10 Mentioning regulators does not help us (investment broker). We think customers know
this. It is not news.
4/7/10 We decided to use to use an outside firm as a custodian. We use a reputable firm.
We did it five years ago. Yes (we mention regulatory oversight). Our clients see this as a part of
corporate governance.
Refocus on community branding
“We are the un-big bank.”
8/1/12 We’ve just had some of our advertising that has come out in – I don’t have a copy of it here
by me, but it says “Trusted” – I can’t remember. It doesn’t say “Trusted bank” but “Trusted
family ties” or something and it says “We have trust in you, you have trust in us” because we
didn’t take any money from the government. We’re well capitalized.
4/7/11 You’ve seen a lot of effort from people in our industry to differentiate themselves from
the forces in mortgage lending that may have contributed to or been the cause of the collapse in
the first place. The interest only loans, that kind of lending activity, and many banks I have seen
have tried to paint a picture to the public that they were not involved in that, that this was more
Wall Street driven and not relevant to their particular organization.
3/8/11 I think focussed primarily, you know, everybody hears about Wall Street organizations
and that’s probably where there’s been some decline in trust, not so much with our bank.
Opportunistic poaching
4/2/11 So we focussed a great deal on the Code of the West in our marketing efforts and continue
to drum that coin into all of our employees [y] We started with this and we see no reason to rebrand anything. It’s an effective marketing tool and I don’t think that you can probably focus on
that particular aspect of our business enough, so that has not changed at all.
11/30/10: “We really had to work on building trust in the four new communities of our
last acquisition. We had to tell people “We didn’t get into the subprime or derivatives markets.
We had to go out there and sell our story that we have been around since 1914 and never closed
a day during the Great Depression. People around here are very proud of that.”

Recommit to networking
2/18/10 Among small shop mortgage brokers very few think of branding. For the most part the
brokers business is about execution and working with brands. In the brokerage business referral
is important and as a result less brand effect. Mortgage brokers rather use a local branch of the
Bank because if something goes wrong they have someone to talk to.
1/28/11 Now we do check every one of those boxes, but now the clients want to see that
physical evidence that you have actually done this and done that. At any level of trust, is pretty
much not there at all. It has to be there on the operational side, has to be documented, if
not documented clients will definitely hold it against you and if anything is wrong it is not
documented, you’re dead in the water.
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